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What Can Sensorimotor Enactivism 
Learn from Studies on Phenomenal 
Adaptation in Atypical Perceptual 
Conditions?
A Commentary on Rick Grush and Colleagues
Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz
Grush et al. present a pilot study on visual adaptation to a remapped color spectrum.
Their preliminary results, being far from conclusive, only partially support the hypo-
thesis that there might exist a form of adaptation to color rotation and color con-
stancy. Proving such flexibility in color vision would substantiate the investigators’ at-
tempt to localize their research outcomes in the context of philosophical theories of
enactive perception. In spite of some limitations, the study exhibits a worthy and novel
approach to the old question of color inverted experience, intended to provide an in-
terdisciplinary account that is both empirically sensitive and philosophically potent.
For the progress of the current investigation it would be constructive not only to con-
duct empirical follow-up studies, but also to conceptually refine the notion of “phe-
nomenal adaptation”, which is the central phenomenon studied here. 
Based upon a distinction between phenomenal conservatism that accepts only
perceptual phenomenology with sensory contents and phenomenal liberalism that ac-
knowledges higher-level contents of perception and cognitive phenomenology, I differ-
entiate between adaptation of the sensory sort and adaptation in the cognitive as-
pects of experience. 
This distinction is used to highlight two different ways of understanding the no-
tion of “phenomenal adaptation”, exhibited by the target article and this commentary.
Grush et al. seem to suggest that phenomenal and (non-phenomenal) semantic adapta-
tion are different forms of a more general phenomenon of adaptation. However, they do
not give any explicit example of the genus of adaptation of which these types are a
species. I contend, in turn, that there is no need to produce such subclasses of the no-
tion; semantic adaptation involving higher-level non-sensory states may also be under-
stood as phenomenal. This follows from phenomenal liberalism. I argue that what is be-
ing processed in the course of phenomenal adaptation is phenomenal character under-
stood in an expansive way that includes high-level contents. The claim may have an
important effect on related empirical work. As a result, enactive sensorimotor adaptation
does not have to be seen as adaptation of the sensory sort, but as adaptation in the
cognitive aspects of experience, such as altered expectations, or beliefs about or sensit-
ivity to kinds of objects encountered in perceptual experience. This phenomenally lib-
eral reading would provide an appropriately more capacious notion than the adaptation
of the sort offered by Grush et al. 
Finally, I claim that the lessons for enactive theories of color perception may
be expanded beyond the implications of the color rotation study. This is demonstrated
by turning to confirmatory and challenging cases of atypical perceptual conditions
and color modifications, such as synesthetic color experiences. 
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1 Introduction
Philosophical thought experiments focusing on
different kinds of visual spectrum manipulation
and  color  inversion  were  initiated  with  John
Locke’s hypothetical case of strawberries produ-
cing  visual  experiences  of  cucumbers  (Locke
1689/1979). They still influence not only philo-
sophical theories of color perception and color
qualia  inversion  (e.g.,  Shoemaker 1982;  Clark
1985;  Levine 1988;  Block 1990;  Casati 1990;
Broackes 1992;  Hardin 1993;  Tye 1993,  2000;
Nida-Ruemelin 1993,  1996;  Byrne &  Hilbert
1997;  Hurley 1998;  Hilbert &  Kalderon 2000;
Cohen 2001; Myin 2001; McLaughlin 2003; Noë
2005;  Churchland 2005;  Macpherson 2005;  Co-
hen &  Matthen 2010;  Burge 2010;  O’Regan
2011),  but  also  psychological  research  on  the
various ways in which our conscious experience
can  be  modified  and  adapted  to  changes  in
visual input, such as space or luminance inver-
sion (Heuer & Rapp 2011;  Anstis 1992), or re-
moving or enhancing colors (Belmore & Shevell
2011).  However,  a  systematic  interdisciplinary
study on  adaptation to an inverted or  rotated
color spectrum has been lacking until now. 
The target article aims to lay the founda-
tion for this, by presenting an experimental pi-
lot study, along with some preliminary results
and a brief discussion of its theoretical implica-
tions.  Like  many other  pilot  studies,  it  faces
some limitations. These are: the small number
of subjects tested; experimenters acting as test
persons; and a complete lack of control condi-
tions in the experimental protocol. The investig-
ators are aware of these constraints and provide
convincing reasons for the choices and strategy,
e.g.,  their  use of a novel,  unpredictable,  long-
lasting, and inconvenient test protocol. Despite
some difficulties relating to both empirical and
conceptual aspects, the study demonstrates an
original,  interesting, and most importantly in-
terdisciplinary  approach  to  the  topic  of  color
perception and  constancy, making an effort to
combine psychological research with philosoph-
ical enactive theories. 
The main objective of this commentary is
to  discuss  what  the  sensorimotor  account  of
perceptual  consciousness  could  learn  from  in-
vestigations  into  phenomenal  adaptation in
atypical visual conditions such us color rotated
spectrum and  synesthesia. In the first section,
after pinpointing the conceptual and methodo-
logical difficulties involved in defining and test-
ing  phenomenal  adaptation  in  Grush  et  al.’s
study, I shall deepen our understanding of phe-
nomenal  adaptation  and  analyze  various  pos-
sible readings of this phenomenon. Such read-
ings depend on different interpretations of the
contents that are admissible to perceptual con-
sciousness (cf.  Hawley & Macpherson 2011). In
the second section, the relationship between the
color rotation study and the enactive account of
color vision is examined in order to demonstrate
what consequences the sensorimotor theory may
expect from results that confirm it in some re-
spects, but not others. Finally, in the last two
sections,  I  claim that the lessons for enactive
theories  of  color  perception may be expanded
beyond  the  implications  of  the  color  rotation
study. This is verified by looking at confirmat-
ory and challenging cases provided by atypical
perceptual  conditions  and  color  modifications
such as synesthetic color experiences. 
2 Phenomenal adaption 
The notion “adaptation”, being central to the tar-
get article, while used comparably to analogous
work on perceptual effects of systematic altera-
tion of sensory input, does not obviously corres-
pond to the unambiguous physiological notion of
adaptation, i.e., a decrease over time in the re-
sponsiveness of sensory receptors to changed, con-
stantly  applied  environmental  conditions  (e.g.,
Held 1965; Noguchi et al. 2004; Smithson 2005).
Distinguishing semantic adaptation (a remapping
of color terms and building immediate semantic
connections to their proper object referents) from
phenomenal adaption, Grush et al. focus on phe-
nomenal aspects of regaining both stimulus con-
stancy and original color arrangement in spite of
changes in input. Given that  adaptation  to nu-
merous  alterations  in  visual  input  has  already
been reported in  various  studies  (Kohler 1962,
1963; Anstis 1992; Heuer & Hegele 2008), Grush
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and colleagues also hypothesize the possibility of
some form of adaptation to a version of the color-
inverted spectrum. They designed a series of ex-
periments  to  assess  phenomenal  adaptation of
visual  experience under  color  rotation  by 120°,
which leads to “tomatoes […] causing red qualia
again, even if the subject is wearing the rotation
gear” (Grush et al. this collection). The definition
of “phenomenal adaptation” in the target article
is “a return to normalcy” and “a gaining of color
constancy under rotation”.  Phenomenal  adapta-
tion then, can be understood as the regaining of
phenomenal qualities of the pre-rotated color ex-
perience while using the rotation equipment for
some  time,  such  that  experienced  colors  are
stable, constant, and non-rotated, i.e., just like in
normal color vision under standard conditions.
But there are reasons to think that adaptation is
not  necessarily  a  phenomenally-conscious  phe-
nomenon. Such an assumption is supported by re-
search with blindsight patients exhibiting, in their
unconscious perception, spectral wavelength sens-
itivity and several other features of color vision
adaptation (Stoerig & Cowey 1989, 1991). In ad-
dition, adaptation should not be confused with
habituation, which is an attentional phenomenon
over which subjects reveal some conscious control
(Webster 2012). This could help to explain some
of the difficulties Grush et al. encountered when
trying to prove the occurrence of phenomenal ad-
aptation  under  color  rotation—which  are  de-
scribed below.
2.1 Conceptual problems — Defining 
phenomenal adaptation
For most of the target paper, Grush et al. treat
“phenomenal adaptation” as if it has a single,
obvious, and straightforward meaning. Only at
the end do they briefly hint at different read-
ings of such adaptation depending on the un-
derstanding  of  the  notions  “phenomenal”  or
“qualia”. That is, their investigation is driven by
certain implicit assumption of phenomenal qual-
ities. However, these terms are quite controver-
sial in philosophy and one may wonder what ac-
tually is examined in the study. 
Philosophers denying the existence of phe-
nomenal  qualities  or  qualia  (e.g.,  Churchland
1985, 1989; Tye 1995, 2000; Dennett 1988) may
understand them in a specific and narrow sense,
either  as  consciously-accessible  properties  of
non-physical  mind-dependent  phenomenal  ob-
jects,  mental  images  called  sense  data  (Lewis
1929;  Robinson 1994),  or  intrinsic  non-repres-
entational  properties  (Block 1990;  Peacocke
1983),  or  non-physical,  ineffable  properties  of
experiences given to their subjects incorrigibly
(Dennett 1988,  1991). Nonetheless, qualia may
be endorsed in a broader sense, namely as phe-
nomenal character. This use of the term gener-
ally refers to introspectively accessible qualitat-
ive aspects of one’s mental life, and it is hard to
deny that these exist. Phenomenal character of
an experience is “what it is like” for a subject
to  undergo  the  experience  (Shoemaker 1994,
2001; Chalmers 1996; Nagel 1974). While enga-
ging in introspection and focusing attention on
the phenomenal character of experience, one is
aware of and gets access to certain phenomenal
qualities that make up the overall phenomenal
character of the experience.
Since there is no single definition of the term
“phenomenal qualities” or “qualia”, there might
be also more than one reading of the notion of
“phenomenal  adaptation”.  Depending  on  the
particular understanding of phenomenality and
the sort of mental states that can have phenom-
enal  qualities  or  enter  phenomenal  conscious-
ness, there seem to be different ways of inter-
preting the phenomenon of adaptation and thus
the possibility of different kinds of adaptation.
A related matter discussed in the philosophy of
perception—between those supporting phenom-
enal liberalism and those who propose phenom-
enal  conservatism  (expansive  and  restrictive
conceptions of the domain of phenomenal con-
sciousness)—is  whether  there  are  high-level
properties  in  the  content  of  perception  and
whether cognitive states have a distinctive and
proprietary phenomenology (Bayne 2009;  Prinz
2012). 
Phenomenal conservatism (e.g.,  Tye 1995,
2000;  Carruthers 2005;  Braddon-Mitchell &
Jackson 2007;  Nelkin 1989), proposing  austere
perceptual  phenomenology,  i.e.,  that  the  con-
tents of perception are exclusively of the sens-
ory sort, promotes sensory adaptation. Phenom-
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enal adaptation, understood as sensory adapta-
tion, has been described in the literature as ad-
aptation to various distortions and systematic
alterations of sensory input employing single or
multiple modalities. For example, subjects wear-
ing prismatic goggles or lenses inverting a visual
scene in terms of color and spatial arrangement
can adapt in the course of time to these new
settings and become able to act normally, be-
cause they develop new visuo-tactile contingen-
cies  that  allow  them to  get  around  and  effi-
ciently see and reach for objects (Held 1965).
Importantly, such an adaptation directly affects
perceptual experience and cannot be explained
by correcting judgments. But this may not be
the whole story about phenomenal adaptation,
since phenomenal character does not have to be
limited to sensory experiences, although tradi-
tionally it is said to be. In line with phenomenal
liberalism, contents of perception may contain
high-level  properties  such  as  kind  properties
(e.g., the property of being a tiger; recognizing
that something belongs to a certain kind—see-
ing a tree  as a  pine tree;  Siegel 2006;  Bayne
2009),  but  also  causal  (the  property  of  one
thing’s causing another;  Strawson 1985;  Siegel
2006;  Butterfill 2009),  and  generic properties
(the property of being nonspecific;  Block 2008;
Grush 2007).  These  properties  are  abstract,
generalized,  and cognitive in their  nature,  yet
they can enter into phenomenal contents. Con-
sequently, a liberal conception, allowing cognit-
ive states to possess phenomenal qualities, and
phenomenal character to be ascribed to concep-
tual  contents,  endorses  cognitive  phenomeno-
logy and thus would opt for phenomenal adapt-
ation in the cognitive aspects of experience. 
The  debate  surrounding  cognitive  phe-
nomenology  involves  many  different  versions
and strengths of the claim that the domain of
phenomenology  extends  beyond  the  sensory
(Strawson 1994; Siewert 1998; Pitt 2004; Bayne
&  Montague 2011;  Horgan &  Tienson 2002;
Kriegel 2002,  2007). Irrespective of its particu-
lar varieties, such a view raises alternative inter-
pretations of Grush et al.’s results. It suggests
that phenomenal adaptation may be present not
only in sensory but also in cognitive aspects of
experience. Both perceptual and cognitive states
determine how we experience the world and ad-
apt  to  changes  in  our  surroundings,  because
they both exhibit their own phenomenal charac-
ters—something it is like to be in such a state
for the subject (Chalmers 1996, p. 10; Strawson
1994; Montague & Bayne 2011). 
Moreover,  conceptual  contents  seem able
to modify the phenomenal character of percep-
tual states; they can cognitively penetrate our
perception  (Raftopoulos 2005;  Macpherson
2012;  Siegel 2012). An  interdisciplinary  ap-
proach to the cognitive penetrability of percep-
tion  assumes  that  there  are  various  ways  in
which conscious perception can be affected by
cognition—i.e.,  by  thoughts,  beliefs,  desires,
judgments, intentions, moods, emotions, expect-
ations,  knowledge,  previous  experiences,  and
memories (Frith & Dolan 1997;  Bar 2003;  Mc-
Cauley &  Henrich 2006;  McCauley &  Henrich
2006;  Raftopoulos 2009;  Vuilleumier &  Driver
2007; Stokes 2012; Deroy 2013; Wu 2013; Vetter
&  Newen 2014;  Briscoe 2014;  Nanay 2014;
Lupyan 2015). In other words, higher cognitive
states not only have causal influence on the con-
tents of perception, they are also explanatorily
relevant in accounting for the processing of per-
ceptual  systems.  It  has  been  shown that  se-
mantic  contents  and categories  play a critical
role  in  perception,  even in  early  sensory pro-
cessing  (cf.  Mroczko et  al. 2009;  Mroczko-
Wąsowicz & Nikolić 2013). This may be exem-
plified in the connection between language and
color vision. For example, languages with a lar-
ger number of generic color terms such as Rus-
sian  have  an  impact  on  color  perception
(Winawer et al. 2007). 
Such  an  integrative  cogno-sensory  ap-
proach, combining high-level cognitive and low-
level sensory aspects, is also manifested in re-
cent theories of concepts relating the possession
of concepts to perceptual adaptation in various
ways (Machery 2009;  Prinz 2010;  Noë this col-
lection). For instance, being sensitive and show-
ing a discriminative response to certain kinds of
objects or combinations of features corresponds
to having concepts for the related kinds of ob-
jects  (Machery 2009;  Deroy 2013,  2014).  Ac-
cording to the ability-based account of concep-
tuality, one can reveal skillful understanding of
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concepts in a perceptual, practical, or emotional
way, meaning that the possession of concepts is
a condition that informs and is informed by our
able  engagement  with  things  (Noë 2012,  this
collection; cf. Wittgenstein 1953). This indicates
a close  interdependence between conceptuality
and sensorimotor processing.
Consequently,  phenomenal  adaptation,  in
light of the enactive theory, would mean enact-
ive adaptation and learning a new set of skills
in the form of new sensorimotor contingencies
and  related  dependencies,  such  as  behavioral
dispositions, predictive possibilities, and cognit-
ive, aesthetic, and emotional reactions. Enactive
adaptation would entail an application of sen-
sorimotor  skills  to  conceptual  understanding,
and as such it could be seen as adaptation in
the cognitive aspects of experience with altered
expectations  or  beliefs  about or  sensitivity  to
kinds of objects encountered in perceptual ex-
perience.  This  phenomenally  liberal  reading
would provide an appropriately more capacious
notion than the adaptation of the pure sensory
sort offered by Grush et al. 
To sum up, departing from a distinction
between phenomenal conservatism that accepts
perceptual  phenomenology with  solely  sensory
contents  and  phenomenal  liberalism  that  ac-
knowledges  higher-level  contents  of  perception
and  cognitive  phenomenology  (Bayne 2009;
Montague &  Bayne 2011),  I  differentiate
between adaptation of the purely sensory sort
and adaptation in the cognitive aspects of ex-
perience.  The distinction  is  used to show the
contrast  in  understandings  of  the  notion  of
“phenomenal  adaptation”  between  the  target
article and this commentary. Grush et al. seem
to suggest that phenomenal and (non-phenom-
enal) semantic adaptation are different forms of
a  more  general  phenomenon  of  adaptation.
However, they do not give any explicit example
of the genus of adaptation of which these later
are a species. I contend, in turn, that there is
no need to produce such subclasses of the no-
tion; semantic adaptation involving higher-level
non-sensory states may also be understood as
phenomenal. Thus, the reading of adaptation I
put forward pertains jointly to the phenomenal
and semantic  aspects  of  regaining of  stimulus
constancy; it assumes a recovery of prototypical
color-object  associations  both  in  phenomenal
experience and in semantic reference in spite of
changes in input. This follows from phenomenal
liberalism. 
The proposed view is that being processed
in  the  headway  of  phenomenal  adaptation  is
phenomenal  character,  understood  in  an  ex-
pansive liberal way that includes high-level con-
tents. Therefore phenomenal adaptation is con-
sidered  to be  the  adjustment of  cognitive  as-
pects of experience. 
2.2 Methodological problems
Dissociating semantic from phenomenal adapta-
tion is problematic. This is because they are in-
terconnected. It is hard to think about the oc-
currence  of  semantic  adaptation  without  phe-
nomenal adaptation taking place and vice versa
– semantic  adaptation is  methodologically ne-
cessary  for  detecting  phenomenal  adaptation.
This presumed correlation might be the reason
why,  when faced with difficulties  finding phe-
nomenal  adaptation  to  a  color-rotated  scene,
the investigators could not confirm any reliable
Stroop results for semantic adaptation. In addi-
tion, it should be noted that Stroop-type tasks
contain  two  components  of  competition—se-
mantic and perceptual (Stroop 1935; Nikolić et
al. 2007;  Mroczko et  al. 2009)—and  as  such
they  exhibit  limitations  in  differentiating
between semantic and perceptual aspects of the
phenomena tested. 
To  assess  the  occurrence  of  phenomenal
color  adaptation  under  rotation,  that  is,  the
process of the normal phenomenal appearance
of  objects  returning,  Grush  et  al.  used  the
memory color effect (Hansen et al. 2006), aes-
thetic judgments of food and people, and sub-
jective reports from their test persons. 
It has often been assumed that subjective
introspective  reports  are  a  generally  reliable
mode of first-person access to one’s current con-
scious  states  or  processes  (Descartes 1984;
Locke 1689/1979;  Hume 1978;  Brentano 1973;
Husserl 1982; Chalmers 2003; Gertler 2001; Hor-
gan et al. 2006; Horgan & Kriegel 2007; Varela
1996;  Rees &  Frith 2007;  Hurlburt &
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Schwitzgebel 2007; Hohwy 2011). However, this
assumption is also problematic. Arguments for
introspective scepticism or even criticism of in-
trospective methodology pose genuine threats to
the trustworthiness of this approach (see Bayne
this collection, for a discussion of such views).
Because  of  this  ambivalence  one  needs  to  be
careful  when  using  subjective  reports  as  a
source of or support for the results presented.
Certain  doubts  about  whether  subjective
reports are trustworthy enough come from the
fact that introspection delivers solely first-per-
son, unverifiable, private data, and thus it is un-
scientific  and often  fallible  (Dennett 1991;  cf.
Zmigrod & Hommel 2011). In addition, subjects
tested  are  often  uncertain  or  disagree  about
what the introspective access actually provides
(Bayne & Spener 2010; see also Bayne this col-
lection) and have difficulty describing their own
conscious  experiences  (Schwitzgebel 2008).
Nonetheless, this is not to deny that they have
some first-person knowledge of phenomenal con-
sciousness.
The  specific  reasons  one  may  have  for
doubting the findings in the context of Grush et
al.’s study are related to the fact that investig-
ators  were  also  the  test  subjects.  We  should
avoid  involving  persons  who  know  the  hypo-
thesis when conducting the experiments, who in
this case tested and evaluated themselves at the
same time. Knowing the research question and
the  expected  or  desired  results  may bias  any
study.
3 Implications of the color rotation study 
for sensorimotor enactivism
Grush et al.’s work could be extended to mani-
fest  a  broader  range  of  philosophical  implica-
tions than those they have mentioned; but, as
the authors state at the end of their article, this
has been left for future philosophical and psy-
chological investigation. Referring to a general
theoretical framework of perception such as the
enactive approach, Grush and colleagues apply
the lessons of their study to sensorimotor enact-
ivism of  perception  without  considering  other
options such as ecological and active perception
approaches  as  potential  targets  (Gibson 1979;
Ballard 1991; Mossio & Taraborelli 2008; Tara-
borelli & Mossio 2008). However, since their hy-
pothesis  focuses  on the  nature  of  perception
based on couplings between sensory stimulation
and motor activity, it appears justified to focus
on the sensorimotor version of the enactive ac-
count, which emphasizes an active exploration
of the environment determining in this way the
content  and  modality  of  conscious  experience
(O’Regan & Noë 2001; Noë 2005).
Sensorimotor theory has been supported
by research on sensory substitution (Proulx &
Störig 2006) and adaptation in haptic percep-
tion,  as  observed  in  mirror  therapy  for
phantom limb pain and in the rubber hand il-
lusion  (Ramachandran &  Rogers-
Ramachandran 1996;  Botvinick &  Cohen
1998).  Most  relevantly,  supporting  evidence
for the sensorimotor theory of color perception
was found in a study on adaptation to half-
split colored goggles (left-field blue/right-field
yellow), which introduced an artificial contin-
gency  between  eye  movements  and  color
changes  (Bompas &  O’Regan 2006b;  cf.
Kohler 1962). These results have left the pos-
sibility of  similar  sensorimotor adaptation to
any arbitrarily-chosen colors open. According
to the account of enactive vision, sensorimotor
principles  are fully capable of  explaining ad-
aptation to alterations in spatial or color-rel-
evant  features  of  input (Noë 2005).  The ad-
aptation  can  be  achieved  by  resuming  con-
stancy through learning a new set of sensor-
imotor contingencies, i.e., patterns of depend-
ence  between  sensory  stimulation  and  move-
ments,  corresponding  to  new features  of  the
input.  Understanding  these  dependencies
provides the required sensorimotor knowledge
that enables perceptual experience. 
The experimental protocol of Grush et al.’s
study directly refers to an enactive account of
color (O’Regan & Noë 2001; Noë 2005; Bompas
&  O’Regan 2006a,  2006b). The authors’ hypo-
thesis  regarding  color  constancy and phenom-
enal  color  adaptation  under  color  rotation  is
compatible with predictions made by sensorimo-
tor  enactivism;  the  induced  adaptation  to  a
remapped spectrum was supposed to imitate a
naturally-occurring  process  of  learning  sensor-
Mroczko-Wąsowicz, A. (2015). What Can Sensorimotor Enactivism Learn from Studies on Phenomenal Adaptation in Atypical Perceptual Conditions? - 
A Commentary on Rick Grush and Colleagues. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 16(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570603 6 | 17
www.open-mind.net
imotor  contingencies.  The  results  obtained  in
this  pilot  study,  although  not  entirely  usable
and  interpretable,  may  yet  provide  food  for
thought  to  enactive  theory,  since  they  offer
some interesting insights  into supportive evid-
ence and the difficulties that the theory needs
to integrate and deal with. 
3.1 An enactivist explanation of the 
results
Subjective reports concerning adaptation to color
constancy,  understood  as  achieving  stability  of
color experience irrespective of visual conditions,
confirm what the enactive theory would expect.
This means that when switching between stand-
ard visual conditions and color rotation, and at
the same time being active in the color environ-
ment  through  altering  color-critical  conditions
such  as  illumination,  viewing  angles,  or  move-
ments, the test persons exhibited temporary dis-
ruption of color constancy leading to an immedi-
ate change of perceived hues. This is allegedly due
to the change of sensorimotor contingencies in-
volved in this experience. 
However,  when a new set of sensorimotor
regularities becomes established, color constancy
is resumed, so that the subjects gain the capacity
for color constancy under rotation and then come
back to normal color constancy when having non-
rotated  visual  input,  i.e.,  the  colors  that  are
stable are different in the two conditions. Hence,
after a period of time for learning new dependen-
cies,  color  constancy  is  restored  and  the  men-
tioned modifications of visual conditions, such as
lighting, have no effect on the phenomenal char-
acter of color experience. 
An interesting observation and an import-
ant point for further deliberation on the develop-
ment of phenomenal color adaptation is delivered
in the subjective report of one of the test sub-
jects, who at the end of his six-day color rotation
period  suddenly  begun  to  be  confused  about
whether his visual input was still rotated or not,
because  everything  appeared  normal.  Since  he
ceased to feel a sense of novelty and strangeness,
he was not sure if he was in a situation of (1) nor-
mal color vision, or rather (2) adaptation to color
constancy under rotation—at least until he expli-
citly reflected on the colors of the surrounding ob-
jects. Although he was evidently in state (2), thus
experiencing stability of rotated colors, one may
suppose  that  his  confusion  about  which  colors
were ‘normal’ in which condition might also indic-
ate the time in which subjects could begin to de-
velop  an  ability  amounting  to  (3)  phenomenal
color adaptation under rotation with colors akin
to genuine colors in situation (1). Speculations en-
visioning the occurrence of this adaptation after a
longer period than the duration of  the current
test  do  not  seem completely  unjustified.  What
would be needed here are further studies that not
only cover a longer time frame of color rotation,
but also focus on searching for a characteristic
marker  signaling  when,  within  a  very  smooth
transition between (2) and (3), phenomenal adap-
tion  under  rotation  (stage(3))  actually  begins.
This  would  be  similar  to  “the  feeling  of
novelty/strangeness”-marker within the transition
between (1) and (2), signaling color rotation. The
lack of this marker and the occurrence of the feel-
ing of normality would indicate that color con-
stancy under rotation has arisen.
The memory color effect was used by Grush
et al. as a method of assessment for phenomenal
color adaptation under rotation. It is an effect of
processing  colors  of  objects  with  typical  colors
that affects the experience of pairings of colors
and  shapes  (Hansen &  Gegenfurtner 2006;
Hansen et al. 2006). The authors explain the ef-
fect by top-down influences of expectations. But
it may also be explained by, for example, cognit-
ive  penetration  of  color  experience  by  beliefs
(Macpherson 2012)  or  sensory  adaptation
through exposure manifesting itself by responding
differently to various kinds of objects or co-occur-
ring  features  (e.g.,  arrangements  of  objects’
shapes  and  their  typical  colors;  Deroy 2013,
2014). All these descriptions express some aspect
of  the  phenomenal  liberalism  discussed  earlier,
and as such they seem more or less equally plaus-
ible for supporting the proposed reading of phe-
nomenal color adaptation under rotation as ad-
aptation in the cognitive aspects of experience. In
standard visual conditions, the memory color ef-
fect  may  suggest  that  expectations  or  beliefs
about a proper color for a certain kind of objects
exert top-down influence on the actual color pro-
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cessing of these objects, their shapes, etc. Thus,
the lessened magnitude of the memory color effect
under color rotation, as found in the study, shows
that the associations of objects with their proto-
typical colors become weaker and may even get
replaced by other associations with new prototyp-
ical colors. 
This outcome is interestingly combined by
Grush et al. with the aforementioned confusion
stage (between (1) and (2)) acquired at the end of
the color rotation period, when the subject stops
having the feeling of novelty and therefore con-
fuses his rotated color experiences with the nor-
malcy  felt  when  perceiving  in  standard  visual
conditions. Both of these results imply not only a
decreasing strength of the old prototypical color
associations, but also the emergence of new asso-
ciations. Such an emergent set of dependencies is
clearly compatible with enactive predictions. The
adaptation that took place due to color rotation
and that has been demonstrated by the memory
color effect appears to be general. This means it
is not just a matter of specific associations of col-
ors with particular objects seen during rotation.
The adaptation refers to the perceptual system as
a whole and its expectations, beliefs, or sensitiv-
ity, contributing to a discriminative response to
kinds of objects in general. For example, the ad-
aptation might manifest itself as the regaining of
a grasp of the way things are colored, as altered
cognitive states (cognitive aspects of experience)
about what red things generally look like or what
red is like. 
3.2 Problems with a definitive 
confirmation of enactivist ideas
Obviously the study protocol would have been
more  plausible  if  color  constancy  had  been
tested in a controlled way with a relevant ob-
jective method and not only confirmed by first-
person  reports.  For  example,  brain  imaging
techniques would be suitable for detecting tem-
porary changes in perceptual states. Also, com-
paring the effect with a proper control group,
matching the  test  group for  gender,  age,  and
color-related experience (e.g., education, profes-
sion),  would certainly increase the strength of
the findings,  providing more evidence for sen-
sorimotor  adaptation  to  color  constancy.  Be-
cause transformations in qualitative experience
may be explained in terms of a dynamic model
of interdependence between sensory inputs and
embodied activity (Hurley &  Noë 2003),  phe-
nomenal  differences  between  color  experiences
can  be  accounted  for  by  different  actions.
Therefore  to  exclude  the  sensorial  interpreta-
tion, the control  group would not  be actively
exploring  their  color  environment,  would  not
change the rotated visual  input through their
own actions, and thus according to the enactive
theory would not develop new sensorimotor de-
pendencies allowing stable color perception. 
For genuine phenomenal color adaptation
different results were observed, i.e., the regain-
ing of non-rotated color constancy while using
the rotation equipment was not successfully es-
tablished—subjective reports and objective as-
sessments made with the memory color  effect
and  aesthetic  judgments  of  color-rotated  food
and people have shown that subjects only star-
ted to adapt in late-rotation, at the end of the
possible  adaptation  period.  Difficulties  in  ro-
bustly confirming phenomenal color adaptation
under  rotation  are  certainly  not  encouraging
news for the enactive view of color. They could
even be interpreted as a falsification of this the-
ory.  However,  according  to  the  investigators,
this is still not decisive, and they speculate that
the reason for this unfavorable outcome could
be the lack of time allowed for relearning the
relevant  sensorimotor  regularities.  Indeed,  for
someone whose phenomenal  color  qualities  re-
mained rotated and did not revert to the genu-
ine color phenomenology, i.e., for whom toma-
toes  continued  to  look  blue,  but  did  not  re-
appear as  red, this  may be the case,  because
perceptual learning, here resulting in action-sen-
sation coupling, is a relatively slow process and
its timing varies from one individual to another
(Goldstone 1998; Seitz & Watanabe 2005). Such
an explanation remains in line with the sensor-
imotor account of perception and cannot be ex-
cluded  without  further  studies.  On  the  other
hand, it may be also possible that the develop-
ment of  adaptation under rotation took place
unconsciously and therefore was not reported by
the subjects. 
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4 Atypical color conditions in 
synesthesia
The lessons for enactive theories of color percep-
tion, pointed to by Grush et al. in their target
article, may also be expanded by including chal-
lenges constituted by other atypical color condi-
tions, namely synesthetic color experiences. 
Synesthesia is  traditionally  considered  to
be a phenomenon in which the stimulation of
one sensory or cognitive pathway (the inducer)
elicits involuntary and consistent sensory exper-
iences (the concurrent) in the same or another
modality (Baron-Cohen et al. 1987;  Baron-Co-
hen &  Harrison 1997;  Ramachandran &  Hub-
bard 2001a, 2001b). As a result, the stimuli cor-
responding to the inducer and the experiences
associated with the concurrent form a highly in-
tegrated  percept—a  phenomenally-unified  ex-
perience  which  may  cover  not  only  sensory
modalities, but also various mental domains in-
cluding conceptual, emotional, bodily, and mo-
tor  aspects  (Mroczko-Wąsowicz &  Werning
2012;  Mroczko-Wąsowicz 2013).  Such  unifica-
tion incorporates the central system and early
stages of processing. Some synesthetes see colors
when dealing with letters or numerals. Individu-
als  with  another  kind  of  synesthesia  perceive
colored patterns in space when hearing sounds.
The prevalence of the phenomenon depends on
the  particular  type  of  synesthetic  association,
with grapheme-color synesthesia being the most
common  (Cytowic &  Wood 1982;  Mroczko-
Wąsowicz & Nikolić 2013). 
Color  sensations  are  the  most  frequent
synesthetic  concurrents  (Marks &  Odgaard
2005), demonstrating color opponent properties
and neural representations more or less similar
to  veridical  color  experiences  (Nikolić et  al.
2007; Hubbard et al. 2005; cf. Hupé et al. 2012;
Van Leeuwen et al. 2010). For some forms of
synesthesia color concurrents may also originate
from information  processing  in  regions  of  the
cortex other than the visual. Recent neuroima-
ging studies demonstrate that synesthetic colors
for numbers or mathematical formulas may also
be produced when the visual cortex is not in-
volved, i.e., by the activation of temporal, pari-
etal, and frontal brain areas (Bor et al. 2007;
Hupé et al. 2012;  Brogaard et al. 2013). This
suggests  that  information  processing  in  non-
visual brain regions may be a source of concur-
rent colors and therefore some forms of synes-
thesia can be seen as high-level perception pro-
ceeding  via  non-standard  mechanisms.  Such
high-level  synesthetic  color  perception  for
mathematical skills, though quite unusual, may
provide supportive evidence for the conception
of  phenomenal  liberalism  and  cognitive  phe-
nomenology. 
5 Synesthetic colors and sensorimotor 
enactivism
Given that synesthesia, similarly to the color ro-
tation  gear,  involves  systematic  distortions  of
color  perception  that  are  consciously  experi-
enced by the subjects, analyzing synesthetic ex-
periences appears relevant in the context of the
present  discussion.  This  is  why proponents of
the  sensorimotor  theory  of  color  perception
might be interested in examining whether their
postulates  also  apply in  cases  employing such
synesthetic  color-addition  gear  (cf.  Hurley &
Noë 2003;  Fingerhut 2011;  Mroczko-Wąsowicz
&  Werning 2012;  Seth 2014;  Ward 2012). The
relevant  propositions  of  enactivism  may  be
stated as follows: 
a. determining  the  modality  of  perceptual
experience by specific sensorimotor signa-
ture  (i.e.,  dependency  between  sensory
stimulations and the activity of the per-
ceiver,  including  their  motor  actions,
bodily changes,  or behavioral skills),  as
well  as  a  necessary  possession  of  such
sensorimotor knowledge of  contingencies
enabling any perception; 
b. flexibility of perceptual experience mani-
fested in the ease of its modification and
adaptation based on learning a new set
of sensorimotor contingencies (Noë 2005);
c. and  finally  epistemic  reliability of  con-
scious  perceptual  experiences  and  their
counterfactual richness (Metzinger 2014;
Seth 2014; see also Seth this collection). 
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The  above  basic  assumptions  underlying
sensorimotor enactivism of  perception may be
challenged by synesthesia in the following way:
A. Synesthetic  concurrent  percepts  (e.g.,
visual  experiences)  are  generated  intern-
ally, not via a direct relation of a synes-
thete with the surrounding environment.
They are triggered without employing the
regular sensorimotor signature related to
these concurrents, like eye saccades in nor-
mal vision. For such permanent inducer-
concurrent couplings, the concurrent mod-
ality and its experiences are never related
to their normal sensorimotor signature. 
B. Synesthetic associations cannot be learned
or adapted to, in contrast to various ma-
nipulations of sensory input such as, for
example, spatial displacement, color inver-
sion, or auditory-visual sensory substitu-
tion (sometimes called an artificial synes-
thesia),  which  are  used  by  sensorimotor
enactivists as examples of the perceptual
system’s adaptation involving an appropri-
ate adjustment of sensorimotor contingen-
cies. Unlike the majority of learned pair-
ings, synesthetic associations are rigid and
not flexible enough to adapt, irrespective
of the amount of exposure to contradict-
ory experiences or training (Baron-Cohen
et al. 1993; Deroy & Spence 2013). 
C. As  a  final  point,  although  synesthetic
colors are reported to be as vivid as non-
synesthetic  colors,  synesthetes  immedi-
ately detect the difference between them,
which confirms the absence of perceptual
presence or phenomenal transparency in
synesthesia,  meaning  its  opacity  or  ex-
periential unrealness, which is the avail-
ability of earlier processing stages to at-
tention  (Metzinger 2003a,  2003b,  2014;
Seth 2014).
As a kind of reply to these challenges, sen-
sorimotor enactivits could claim that enactivism
focuses on standard perceptual mechanisms and
therefore has difficulties explaining perception-
like experiences in synesthesia, as well as that
synesthetic concurrents (often colors) lack some
important features of typical perceptual experi-
ences  and  properties  of  sensorimotor  engage-
ment,  e.g.,  corporeality.  However,  this  would
not really be explanatory. One possible way of
vindicating how the enactive theory could ac-
commodate  such  atypical  non-adaptive  color
conditions is to claim that there is actually no
need  for  synesthetic  colors  to  adapt,  because
they do not  carry  any information about  the
colors of objects in the synesthetes’ environment
—whereas  adaptation  is  a  retrieval  of  how
things are colored. To put it in enactive terms,
synesthetic colors do not figure in patterns of
appearance reflecting dynamic relations between
perceiver, object, and light (Ward 2012). Unlike
the rotation gear, synesthesia does not determ-
ine the way things appear to the perceiver; i.e.,
the way worldly objects and surfaces modify the
light is not affected.
6 Discussion
As concluded by Grush et  al.  the results  ob-
tained  in  their  study show that  color  experi-
ences changed in the early stage of application
of the rotation gear and became stable, that is,
they adapted to color constancy in the late ro-
tation  stage,  without  however  consistently
showing significant  phenomenal  adaptation  by
the end of the test. The investigators leave open
a  potential  explanation  of  this  outcome.  The
difference between this result and other studies,
in  which  achieving  phenomenal  adaptation  to
spatial displacement or luminance inversion was
more successful, may suggest that color sensa-
tions are special properties of early visual pro-
cessing relatively difficult to phenomenally ad-
apt as well as more resistant to penetration and
manipulation by cognition (Fodor 1983;  Pyly-
shyn 1999; Brogaard & Gatzia forthcoming; but
cf.  Macpherson 2012;  Siegel 2012;  Vetter &
Newen 2014). At least this seems to be the case
for the general population. 
Synesthesia, although not considered to be
an adaptive plastic phenomenon, may be a case
in which some modifications take place, such as
cognitive  penetration  of  perception  including
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early sensory processing. Synesthetic colors are
frequently  modified  by  cognitive  operations,
conceptual  contents,  contextual  expectations,
linguistic  modulation,  cultural  factors,  and
other  semantic  knowledge  mechanisms  (Dixon
et  al. 2000;  Simner 2007,  2012;  Meier 2013;
Mroczko et  al. 2009;  Mroczko-Wąsowicz &
Nikolić 2013,  2014). Since synesthetes are able
to penetrate this early aspect of vision it would
be interesting to investigate whether synesthet-
ically-perceived colors change under rotation. If
so, is this in the same or in a different way to
non-synesthetic,  phenomenally-transparent  col-
ors? 
Synesthetic  colors  are  in  some  respects
similar to the color experiences of rotation-gear
wearers.  In both cases,  subjects are aware of
the  fact  that  what  they  see  is  not  reliably
colored, i.e.,  that their abnormal color experi-
ences are not actual colors of the surroundings.
 On the other hand, these color experiences dif-
fer remarkably from each other. Whereas rota-
tion gear wearers’ color experiences are able to
adapt  to  fall  in  line  with  what  the  subjects
know  to  be  true  about  colors  of  the  things
around them, synesthetes’ color experiences do
not display such flexibility. Thus, a theoretically
founded hypothesis  is  that  irrespective  of  the
form of color synesthesia to be used in a color
rotation  experiment  (e.g.,  grapheme-color,
sound-color, time unit-color synesthesia) synes-
thetic colors would not alter. 
Admittedly,  the  sensorimotor  theory  of
color  has  difficulties  explaining  many  of  the
features of the phenomenon of synesthesia, but
this does not mean it is completely useless in
the context of synesthesia. The theory could be
used to account for the asymmetry in adapta-
tion capability between those experiencing syn-
esthetic  and non-synesthetic  colors.  From the
perspective  of  the  enactive  view  of  color,  it
could be proposed that the rotation gear inter-
feres with regular color perception, because the
equipment introduces a new set of sensorimo-
tor dependencies. This is the reason why after
wearing the rotation gear  for  some time and
acclimatizing to the conditions, the rotated col-
ors begin to appear normal, that is, the sub-
jects’ ability to perceive original colors returns
—such that phenomenal color adaptation un-
der  rotation  takes  place.  Unlike  the  rotated
color perception of non-synesthetes, synesthetic
subjects  (associators)  do not  experience  their
additional colors as attributed to perceived ob-
jects but as seen in their “mind’s eye”. There-
fore the concurrent colors do not affect their
ability for regular color vision. An explanation
of why there is  no phenomenal color adapta-
tion  in  synesthesia  could  be  that  synesthetic
colors just fail  to adapt because they do not
need to make room for non-synesthetic colors
(cf. Ward 2012). Thus, in line with the sensor-
imotor account, we could interpret the differ-
ence  between  ordinary  color  perception  and
color synesthesia as  a difference between real
and  seeming  engagement.  However,  another
type of synesthetes, projectors, who see colors
as projected onto inducing objects, may require
a different explanation. Since this group of syn-
esthetes demonstrates an external frame of ref-
erence for their  synesthetic colors,  projectors’
phenomenal  color  adaptation  under  rotation
might be comparable to the adaptation of non-
synesthetes.  A  testable  empirical  prediction
here would be that it is possible for projector
synesthetes’ colors to adapt after using a rota-
tion equipment specially adjusted to interfere
with internally-generated concurrent color  ex-
periences.  Depending  on  the  outcome of  this
prospective study, which could be designed in
such a way that it would take into account all
the differences related to color phenomenology,
the sensorimotor theory of color may gain new
insights into the threat of synesthesia.
What  sensorimotor  enactivism  can  also
learn from studies on phenomenal adaptation in
various perceptual conditions is that the notion
of  “phenomenal  adaptation”  applies  to  some
conditions, but not others. There may also be
different senses of the notion, and apart from
“adaptation of the sensory sort” a rigorous ana-
lysis should consider “adaptation in the cognit-
ive aspects of experience”—an expansive inter-
pretation  supported  by phenomenal  liberalism
and cognitive phenomenology. In addition, the
extent to which the phenomenon of adaptation
may  develop  varies  among  various  perceptual
conditions. No matter the exact magnitude of
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the  adaptive  effects  discussed,  the  very exist-
ence of phenomenal adaptation to alterations of
sensory input, or its general lack, needs to be
fully integrated by philosophical theories, espe-
cially by sensorimotor enactivist theories of per-
ception that attempt to account for all the dy-
namics  related to perception.  This  adaptation
highlights  that  perceptual  experience  is  more
flexible and variable than usually presumed.
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